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Working Long Hours and Early
Career Outcomes in the High-End
Labor Market
Dora Gicheva, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
This study establishes empirically a positive but nonlinear relation-
ship between weekly hours and hourly wage growth. For work-
ers who put in over 47 hours per week, 5 extra hours are associated
with a 1% increase in annual wage growth. This correlation is not
present when hours are lower. The relationship is especially strong
for young professionals. Data on promotions provide evidence in
support of a job-ladder model that combines higher skill sensitivity
of output in higher-level jobs with heterogeneous preferences for
leisure. The results can be used to account for part of the gender
wage gap.
I. Introduction
The relationship between working hours and career advancement has
received attention from various fields within the social sciences; Blair-Loy
ð2004, 284Þ notes, “scholars have lamented how firms reserve the best jobs
and opportunities for ‘ideal workers’, who can give long hours to their
employer without being encumbered by family responsibilities.” Reich
ð2001Þ points out that increasing earnings inequality means that taking a
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second-grade job that allows for more free time requires a worker to give
up more current and future income. Akerlof ð1976Þ is among the first econ-
omists to propose the idea that the labor market equilibrium can entail in-
efficiently long hours.
This study links long hours to future career outcomes, in particular
promotions and wage growth. The paper’s main contribution is to present
strong empirical evidence of a positive relationship between working hours
and career outcomes and to link the two in a dynamic context providing
theoretical justification for the observed relationship. Data from a four-
wave panel survey of registrants for the Graduate Management Admission
Test ðGMATÞ and from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth ðNLSY79Þ suggest that for young highly educated workers
who usually put in long hours, working 5 extra hours per week is linked to a
1% increase in annual wage growth. The magnitude of this relationship
implies that for workers who are at the start of their careers, the shadow
wage is as large as twice the observed hourly wage. The estimated coeffi-
cient is statistically indistinguishable from zero when weekly hours are less
than 48.
Standard learning-by-doing theory combined with a model of promo-
tions derived from the complete-information framework in Gibbons and
Waldman ð1999Þ can explain the observed relationship. I extend the Gib-
bons and Waldman ð1999Þ model to include the worker’s labor supply de-
cision and introduce heterogeneity in the employees’ preferences for lei-
sure. Workers with low disutility of hours or high inherent ability sort
into career-oriented jobs, which offer promotion opportunities and are
associated with longer working hours and faster wage growth. Willing-
ness to work extra hours and inherent ability are strategic complements
in this model.
The correlation between longer hours and higher pay has been explored
at length by labor economists, including in the experimental literature
on gift exchange ðe.g., Charness 2004; Charness and Kuhn 2007; Fehr and
Goette 2007Þ, but this paper focuses on the intertemporal relationship be-
tween labor supply and earnings and examines the slope of the wage pro-
file. In maximizing lifetime utility, forward-looking workers may choose
hours that are higher than the current-period optimal value. This idea is
described qualitatively in Bell and Freeman ð2001Þ, who use differences in
the dispersion of wages to explain why US employees work longer hours
than their German peers. Decreasing returns to learning by doing combined
with increasing observed wages make the framework here similar to the in-
tertemporal labor supply theory in Imai and Keane ð2004Þ. A lifetime op-
timization model with an exogenously determined wage profile instead
of a learning-by-doing mechanism ðMaCurdy 1981; Altonji 1986Þ yields a
negative correlation between current hours and future wage growth in that
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hours are predicted to increase over a worker’s life cycle as wages grow at a
decreasing rate.
In my study, I focus on the high-end labor market; all workers in the
GMAT Registrant Survey sample are college educated ðmany of them
hold degrees from top institutionsÞ and tend to have relatively high earn-
ings. White-collar jobs are prevalent in the data set. Thus the paper adds to
the literature spurred by the recent increase in interest in this segment of
the labor force, particularly with the upward trend of female participation
in the high-end labor market.1
I focus specifically on the future career implications of current labor
supply choices and argue that exogenous preferences for leisure can be
used to account for up to half of the gender gap in wage growth in white-
collar occupations. Studies show that there remains a considerable gap be-
tween male and female earnings, even when controlling for observables
like occupation and undergraduate major.2 Most studies of the gender gap
in earnings, with the exception of Goldin and Katz ð2008Þ and Bertrand,
Goldin, and Katz ð2010Þ, do not control for differences in the labor supply
of men andwomen, thus ignoring the disparity in weeks and hours worked
and noneducation spells out of the labor force. I find that hours account
for some but not all of the gender difference in wage growth.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. A theoretical model of pro-
motions that predicts an upward-sloping and convex relationship between
hours and wage growth is developed in Section II. Section III describes the
data, and Section IV presents evidence that wage growth is an increasing
function of hours when hours are high. Data on promotions are used in
Section V to test other predictions of the job-ladder model. Section VI
discusses alternative theoretical frameworks and derives implications of
1 Goldin and Katz ð2008Þ use data from the Harvard and Beyond study to ex-
amine the employment and family composition trends of Harvard alumni who
graduated between 1969 and 1992; they find that the proportion of women who
obtain an MBA degree increased from 5% to 14% while for men the change is
from 11% to 19%.
2 Montgomery and Powell ð2003Þ use the first three waves of the GMAT Reg-
istrant Survey to compare GMAT takers who obtained an MBA to those who did
not and find a lower gender wage gap among business degree recipients. Arcidia-
cono, Cooley, and Hussey ð2008Þ use all four waves and include fixed effects and
additional controls for program characteristics to show that the returns to an MBA
degree are actually lower for women. These seemingly contradictory findings can
be reconciled by Bertrand et al. ð2010Þ. Their study follows the careers of MBA
graduates of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and finds that male
and female graduates start off with similar earnings but quickly diverge. Their paper
focuses on three factors contributing to this trend: differences in training prior to
obtaining an MBA, different patterns of time out of work, and differences in hours
worked per week. The latter two are largely determined by having children.
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the empirical results for the shadow wage and the gender wage gap, and
Section VII concludes.
II. Model of Promotions with Heterogeneous
Preferences for Leisure
As the empirical evidence summarized above and presented in detail in
Section IV implies, the relationship between hours and wage growth is
nonlinear. Hours worked have little or no correlation with the change in
log wages when hours are low, but the relationship is positive and strong
for higher values of hours. In this section, I present a theoretical model that
predicts the observed relationship. In particular, I present a promotions
model with learning by doing. The wage structure is derived from the
complete information framework in Gibbons and Waldman ð1999Þ. I add
the worker’s labor supply decision and impose heterogeneity in workers’
valuation of leisure. As in Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor ð1996Þ, workers
who early on reveal low disutility of labor advance to higher levels within
the firm.
The basic idea behind the model is that there are two types of jobs:
“career” jobs, which offer higher returns to skill accumulation, and “non-
career” jobs, which do not offer promotion opportunities. Only workers
who have low disutility of hours or high ability to learn self-select into the
first type of jobs, which creates a convexity in the resulting relationship be-
tween hours and the change in wages. The idea that jobs within the same
hierarchical level can differ in how likely promotions are, and workers are
sorted efficiently across jobs is also developed inClemens ð2012Þ. Themodel
in Clemens ð2012Þ is similarly based on Gibbons andWaldman ð1999Þ, but
additional heterogeneity is introduced at the job, not worker, level.
I simplify theGibbons andWaldman ð1999Þmodel to two job levels and
two time periods. Workers start off with effective productivity h1, which
in the second period evolves according to h2 5 h1ð11 vih1Þ. Here vi rep-
resents the speed of learning,3 and h1 denotes first-period hours. Hourly
output in position j5 f1; 2g equals Yijt 5 dj 1 cjhit, where 0 < c1 < c2 and
0 < d2 < d1. This wage structure implies that workers with low hit produce
more in lower-level positions. Output in upper-level jobs is more sensitive
to a worker’s productivity and hours, since hi2 depends on h1. This implies
that managerial jobs require high levels of productivity, while in nonmana-
gerial jobs there is less variation in output associated with productivity dif-
ferentials. I assume that output with no labor market experience is lower in
job 2, and all workers start in the lower-level job: d1 1 c1h1 > d2 1 c2h1.
4
3 Assuming that learning is mostly general, job mobility would not affect the
model.
4 Two additional assumptions for the parameters are that c1=c2 < 0:5 and
ðd2 1 c2h1Þ=ðd1 1 c1h1Þ > 0:65, from which it follows that c1ðd1 1 c1h1Þ < c2ðd2 1
788 Gicheva
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Utility is separable in consumption and leisure, and the disutility from
hours is determined by a parameter bi in the utility function. A higher bi
indicates stronger preference for leisure. Let
Uiðwi1;wi2; hi1; hi2; biÞ5 ðwi1hi1 2 bih2i1Þ1 ðwi2hi2 2 bih2i2Þ:
I assume that bi and the inherent ability parameter vi are independent; a
correlation in these variables would not add much to the results of in-
terest. Firms are assumed to be price takers, and effective ability hit and the
disutility parameter bi are observable, so wages equal wij 5 dj 1 cjhit:
There are two possible paths that wages can take. When a worker is not
promoted in the second period, the objective function is
max
h1;h2
½ðd1 1 c1h1Þh1 2 bih211 ½ðd1 1 c1h1ð11 vih1ÞÞh2 2 bih22;
and optimal period 1 hours equal optimal period 2 hours.5
The objective function on the promotion path is
max
h1;h2
½ðd1 1 c1h1Þh1 2 bih211 ½ðd2 1 c2h1ð11 vih1ÞÞh2 2 bih22:
Hours with and without promotion are positive under the assumption
that 2bi > c2h1vi.
6 For given bi and vi, optimal period 1 hours in “career”
jobs are higher than optimal hours in “noncareer” jobs.
Workers maximize utility by choosing hours and whether to be on a
promotion path or not. Then for each vi there exists exactly one cutoff
bðviÞ such that Vno promoi ðb; viÞ5 Vpromoi ðb; v1Þ, where Vðb; vÞ denotes the
value function. In addition, the cutoff bðviÞ satisfies the assumption that
2bðviÞ > c2h1vi.
Since the cutoff bðviÞ is unique, in the second period employers promote
all workers with ability parameter vi whose disutility of hours bi < bðviÞ. In
addition, bðvÞ is a linearly increasing function of u. This implies that for
workers with higher “ability to learn” u the cutoff b is higher, so they can
5 All derivations are available in Gicheva ð2010Þ.
6 The fact that hours without promotion do not change over time is a conse-
quence of the functional form and parameter assumptions because the investment
returns from higher first-period hours ððd1 1 c1h1Þ1 c1h1vih2Þ are equal in equi-
librium to the labor supply effects of higher productivity in the second period,
ðd1 1 c1h1Þ1 c1h1vih1 ðI am thankful to a referee for pointing this outÞ. Adding a
discount factor to second-period utility would result in hours that are increasing
over time. Hours with promotion decrease from period 1 to period 2, but adding
discounting to the model can reverse this trend for certain values of the parameters.
In the data used for this study, hours tend to increase over time, but the discount
parameter is omitted from the model to simplify the exposition.
c2h1Þ. Intuitively, these assumptions impose that c2, the sensitivity of output in
upper-level positions to the level of productivity, is relatively high.
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compensate for higher disutility of hours with faster learning on the job.
If there is an exogenous increase in the wage differential between the two
types of jobs ðd2 or c2 goes upÞ, the cutoff bwill be higher for all u, and also
hours in “career” jobs increase in both periods. This is consistent with the
idea in Bell and Freeman ð2001Þ and Kuhn and Lozano ð2008Þ that more
wage dispersion is associated with higher average hours.
In this model the wages of workers who do not get a promotion grow
at a rate of Dw5w2 2w1 5 c1h1ðvh1Þ, so that ðyDwÞ=ðyh1Þ5 c1h1v. With
a promotion wage growth is
Dw5w2 2w1 5 d2 1 c2h1ð11 vh1Þ2 d1 2 c1h1
and ðyDwÞ=ðyh1Þ5 c2h1v > c1h1v.7 The source of differences in the rela-
tionship between hours and wage growth can be both self-selection of
higher-ability workers into “career” jobs and the wage structure, but the
latter is responsible for the nonlinearity.
For two workers with the same u but bi < bðvÞ and bj > bðvÞ, it holds
that h1i > h1j ðusing the result that optimal period 1 hours in “career” jobs
are higher than optimal hours in “noncareer” jobs and the feature of the
model that hours are decreasing in bÞ; thus longer hours in the first period
result in faster wage growth. If u is small, variations in hours worked do
not change the slope of the wage profile much. Assuming that the speed of
learning declines with experience, the difference in wage growth will be
most pronounced for young workers, who have the highest incentive to
invest in human capital accumulation.
Conditioning separately on hours or the speed of learning, the proba-
bility of promotion is nondecreasing in both u and h1 ðsee appendix,
sec. AÞ. In other words, the probability of receiving a promotion can be
written as a nondecreasing function of u; the parameters of the model, but
not hours, enter this function. Similarly, when the promotion probabil-
ity is expressed as a function of hours and the parameters, but not u, the
function is nondecreasing in hours.8 At lower levels of hours most work-
ers’ wages grow at the rate of c1h1ðvh1Þ, while when hours are high the
probability of promotion increases and a higher proportion of workers ex-
7 This relationship still holds true when w1 and w2 denote the level, rather than
the natural log, of observed wages because
c1h1v
d1 1 c1h1
<
c2h1v
d1 1 c1h1
:
8 Using both first-period hours and the speed of learning u, promotions can be
predicted perfectly because there is no uncertainty component. In the data both h1
and u are measured with error ðu in particularÞ, so randomness is introduced in the
estimation throughmeasurement error. I approximate the shape of the relationship
between hours or ability and the probability of promotion using a probit model.
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perience wage growth given by d2 1 c2h1ð11 vh1Þ2 d1 2 c1h1. This regime
change introduces the convexity in the relationship between hours and
wage growth.9
Figure 1 shows simulation results for the promotions model.10 To il-
lustrate the implications of the theory, in panel A I plot the simulated data
for an economy with 1,000 workers, and in panel B I show the predicted
change in wages from a nonlinear least squares regression with 100,000 ob-
servations. The slope of the depicted relationship is close to zero for lower
values of hours ð.0028 when h1 < 2:155Þ and increases when hours are high
ðthe point estimate is .0115 for h1 ≥ 2:155Þ. The 2.155 cutoff is estimated
9 A different extension of the Gibbons and Waldman ð1999Þ model that may
yield some comparable predictions to the model presented here can be found in
Gibbons andWaldman ð2006Þ. The authors expand on their earlierwork bymaking
experience in high-level jobs more valuable for workers in upper levels of the job
ladder. Then random sorting into starting jobs, for example, due to the state of the
economy at the time of job market entry ðmodeled through differences in the
parameter d2Þ, can sort workers across fast-track and “noncareer” paths, keeping u
constant. In my model, for a given u, the sorting is based on the random draw of b,
not d2. The theory here would also predict higher return to experience ðvh1Þ in
upper-level jobs if hours are longer in higher-level positions ðsee n. 6Þ. Optimal
hours in my model are increasing in the rate of learning-by-doing u, so if workers
had the same disutility of leisure and it was incorporated in the Gibbons and
Waldman ð2006Þmodel, a positive relationship between hours and wage growth is
a likely prediction. However, it would be harder for the Gibbons and Waldman
ð2006Þ interpretation to explain differences in hours worked and career outcomes
within the same cohort for a constant u. For example, it would not be possible to
make the gender gap argument in Sec. VI.B.
FIG. 1.—Hours and wage growth from simulations.A, Model simulation results,
N 5 1,000. B, Simulation results: predicted change in log wage, N 5 100,000.
Simulated data based on the model in Section II. The choice of the disutility
parameter b and inherent ability u is such that 300b and 200v have x2 distributions
with 50 degrees of freedom. Other parameter values: h1 5 0.1; c1 5 0.075; c2 5 0.52;
d1 5 0.616; d2 5 0.545.
10 The parameter values are: h1 5 0.1; c1 5 0.075; c2 5 0.52; d1 5 0.616; d2 5
0.545. The disutility parameter b and inherent ability u are chosen such that 300b
and 200v have x2 distributions with 50 degrees of freedom.
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as a parameter in the model. The relationship between hours and wage
growth is positive but very small at low levels of period 1 hours because in
the simulations c1 is set to be greater than zero. With the parameter values
chosen for this simulation, 22.49% of workers are promoted in the second
period, and the mean of h1 is 1.9876 with a standard deviation of 0.4493.
Extending the model to include symmetric learning about u in a manner
similar to the main analysis in Gibbons and Waldman ð1999Þ would not
change the main theoretical implications. There are two reasons specific to
the extension in this paper that undermine the importance of incomplete
information: the utility function implies that workers are risk neutral, and
there are only two periods, which is not sufficiently long for learning to
affect agents’ choices. Suppose that, following Gibbons and Waldman
ð1999Þ, u is initially unobserved by workers and firms but has a known
distribution and expected value v. Note that in this setup of the model, no
learning occurs between periods 1 and 2 because realized period 1 output
depends only on h1; this would be the case even if there was random noise
in output so that yijt 5 dj 1 cjðhit 1 εijtÞ. Then workers will simply use v
instead of vi when solving the two-period utility maximization problem,
and differences in h1 will be based solely on the heterogeneity in bi. Con-
sider two cases. If second-period job assignments are made before the re-
alization of second-period output, which parallels the setup in Gibbons and
Waldman ð1999Þ, we may observe negative wage growth for some workers
who receive a promotion but have values of bi close to the cutoff bðvÞ. In
the ðprobably less likelyÞ case that period 2 productivity is revealed prior
to period 2 job assignment, negative wage growth will not be observed.
In both cases, the convex relationship between first-period hours and aver-
age wage growth will still be present.
III. Data
To study empirically the relationship betweenworking hours and future
wage growth, I use a panel survey of registrants for the Graduate Man-
agement Admission Test11 and supplement the findings with results from
the 1979 cohort of the NLSY. The GMAT Registrant Survey has several
features that make it well suited for studying the relationship between long
hours and career wage growth. The sampled group is relatively homoge-
neous in terms of background ðe.g., parental educationÞ, schooling, and
occupation. It is possible to infer ability from education variables like the
quality of undergraduate institution attended or college major. I am also
able to identify the effects of a graduate management degree. All respon-
11 The survey was conducted by the Batelle Memorial Institute on behalf of the
Graduate Management Admission Council. Examples of other studies using this
data set are Arcidiacono et al. ð2008Þ and Montgomery and Powell ð2003Þ.
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dents obtain a college degree, and most hold white-collar jobs. A high pro-
portion of workers report having managerial responsibilities, so promotion
decisions are particularly important for this group. Long hours, which are
the focus of this paper, are common.Women in the survey have high labor
market participation rates, including full-time and overtime work.
The universe for the GMAT Registrant Survey consists of all individu-
als who registered to take the GMAT between June 1990 and March 1991
and were living in the United States at the time of registration. The survey
consists of four waves; the first one was conducted shortly after regis-
tration for the test and had a response rate of 84% ð5,853 responses out of
7,006 surveys sent outÞ. The second wave was sent out about 15 months
after test registration and received 4,833 responses. Wave 3 took place
3.5–4 years after registration and received 4,533 responses. The final wave
was conducted about 7 years after registration for the GMAT ð3,769 re-
sponsesÞ. Almost all responses came from previous survey completers;
only a few of those interviewed dropped out temporarily but then returned
to the study.
Respondents are given the choice of time period in which to report earn-
ings;12 I use reported earnings and hours for the current job to construct
hourly wages. All wages are measured in 1991 dollars; I drop one observa-
tion for which the inflation-adjusted wage is less than $2 at the second in-
terview, one for which the wage is lower than $2 at the time of the fourth
interview, and four observations for which the period 4 wage exceeds $200.
All other wages are between $2 and $200. The initial installment of the
survey collects information on previous labor market experience, on which
I base the measure of actual experience. I then use the detailed employment
history provided in each installment of the survey to update actual expe-
rience accounting for periods spent out of work.
I drop observations with missing hours in the first, second, or fourth
survey or wages in the second or fourth period. I also exclude workers
who are self-employed in period 2. For workers with missing observa-
tions for age or experience in the second wave, mother’s education, or
undergraduate major, I impute these values using the predicted values
from regressions on gender, race, age ðif availableÞ, number of children
under 18, marital status, and whether enrolled in school ðwith the ex-
ception of the first two variables, which are static, all others refer to the
second interviewÞ. Since none of the controls are good predictors of the
time between interviews, missing observations for this variable are re-
placed with the mean time between interviews for the rest of the sample.
The number of imputed observations is 32 for mother’s education, 27 for
12 The survey asks for total pre-tax earnings, including any bonuses, commis-
sions, and tips.
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age, 36 for experience, 7 for undergraduate major, and 164 for number of
days between interviews.13 The high rates of enrollment in postgraduate
education are the most common reason for dropping respondents from
the sample: most workers who are unemployed are attending school full
time. Of the 3,769 individuals who responded to the fourth survey, 3,232
workers reported valid wages, for 800 of which there is no valid second-
wave wage observation. The final sample consists of 1,911 respondents:
1,103 men and 808 women.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the GMAT Registrant Survey
sample and provides a comparison with the group of respondents whom
I exclude from the sample. The GMAT Registrant Survey focuses on
young professional workers; the average age at the beginning of the study
is under 28 years. Hourly wages are relatively high for this age group.
Around 31% of people in the sample come from a family with a college-
educated mother. One unique feature of the data is that half of all respon-
dents completed an undergraduate major in business. Over one-third of
workers had managerial responsibilities at the time of their first interview.
Minority respondents are oversampled, and so are women to a small de-
gree.14
The sample selection procedure guarantees that all respondents are em-
ployed at the time of their first interview; this is the main difference be-
tween the subset of GMAT registrants used in the estimation and the
rest of the surveyed group. As table 1 suggests, only 60% of the people I
drop are employed at t5 1 and 31% are enrolled in school ðcompared to
16% in the main sampleÞ. Even though the sampled workers are on av-
erage slightly older ð27.7 years compared to 26.5 yearsÞ and have an ad-
ditional 1.5 years of experience, wages and hours do not differ by attrition
status. The average annual growth in log wages between the second and
fourth interviews is 0.062 for respondents in the sample. This is lower
than the mean for respondents excluded from the sample, but 45% of
observations with nonmissing wage growth in the latter group have zero
years of experience at the time of their first interview, which can explain
their steep wage profile. It is unclear whether one group is of higher ability:
workers in the sample have slightly higherGMAT scores but fewer of them
come from a family with a college-educated mother, while undergraduate
grade point average is the same for both groups.
The hours variable measures usual hours worked per week in the cur-
rent job. I drop observations for which hours in wave 2 are less than 15,
13 Results that exclude the imputed observations are available from the author
upon request; there are no noteworthy differences between the two sets of esti-
mates.
14 In the 1990–91 testing cycle, women constituted 36.8% of test takers, and
83.7% of people taking the test self-reported their race as white ðnon-Hispanic;
Graduate Management Admission Council 1996Þ.
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and if reported hours exceed 90 I set them equal to 90 in order to eliminate
any influence of outliers.15 Figure 2 shows the distribution of reported
hours by wave. Hours increase slightly over time; the mean is 42.3 for the
first survey and increases to 47.9 by the time of the last interview. There
is some clustering of hours at 40, but the number of people who report
working 40 hours per week decreases over time at the expense of more
workers reporting overtime work.16
The data suggest that while hours increase slightly over time, there is
relatively little mobility across the distribution. The sample correlation
between period 1 and period 2 hours is 0.472, and this number increases to
0.517 when I exclude respondents enrolled in school at the time of either
the first or second interview. Table 2 shows a more detailed transition
15 This change affects 17 observations.
16 The proportion of workers who report 40 hours for survey waves 1, 2, 3, and
4 is, respectively, 33.85%, 30.93%, 29.00%, and 24.23%.
Table 1
GMAT Registrant Survey Summary Statistics
In Sample Not in Sample p-Value
ðTwo-TailedÞN Mean SD N Mean SD
Female 1,911 .423 3,942 .440 .217
Asian 1,911 .127 3,942 .139 .203
Black 1,911 .120 3,942 .144 .013
Hispanic 1,911 .154 3,942 .148 .533
Married 1,911 .349 3,942 .248 .000
Number of children 1,911 .183 .613 3,942 .139 .528 .004
Age 1,884 27.668 5.959 3,870 26.501 5.631 .000
Mom has college degree 1,911 .311 3,848 .366 .000
In school 1,911 .156 3,942 .309 .000
College GPA 1,840 3.020 .420 3,653 3.018 .425 .891
Majored in business 1,911 .503 3,896 .524 .136
Majored in social science 1,911 .150 3,896 .173 .025
Majored in engineering 1,911 .146 3,896 .109 .000
Majored in science 1,911 .126 3,896 .109 .061
GMAT score/100 1,606 4.960 1.026 3,176 4.766 1.076 .000
Took GMAT 1,911 .840 3,942 .806 .002
Employed 1,911 1 3,838 .604 .000
Hours 1,911 42.295 10.581 2,318 41.901 11.471 .251
Experience 1,875 5.875 5.760 3,736 4.356 5.167 .000
Wage 1,867 13.905 6.248 2,138 13.919 7.442 .949
Annual wage growth 1,911 .062 .067 521 .086 .090 .000
Entry level manager 1,911 .219 3,942 .156 .000
Higher level manager 1,911 .144 3,942 .116 .002
NOTE.—The omitted category for college major is humanities/other. Marital status, number of children,
age, whether in school, and all employment variables refer to the first interview. Annual wage growth is
the change in log wages between the second and fourth waves divided by the number of years between
interviews.
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matrix. Of workers who started off in the highest third of the distribution,
66% remained in the highest quantile in the next period. If someone
initially reported 40 hours or less, the probability that she is working 40
or fewer hours by the last installment of the survey is 58%.
The fact that a worker’s hours are strongly correlated in the short run
ð1 or 2 yearsÞ is particularly useful in the estimation. To construct hourly
wages I divide reported earnings in period t by hours worked per week
also in period t and the relevant time measure. The dependent variable
in the GMAT Registrant Survey regression specifications is the annual-
ized change in hourly wages between the second and fourth interviews ða
period of 5–6 yearsÞ: y5 ½lnðE4=h4Þ2 lnðE2=h2Þ=s, where s is the num-
ber of years between the second and fourth surveys; s can be a fraction.
As Borjas ð1980Þ and Deaton ð1988Þ, among others, point out, the division
method combined with measurement error is likely to make observed hours
in period 2 endogenous and lead to biased estimates if h2 is also used as a
regressor. To solve this problem I use first-period hours h1 instead of h2
on the right-hand side, but it is necessary to assume that the measurement
error in hours is serially uncorrelated. The NLSY79 specifications use the
FIG. 2.—Distribution of reported weekly hours over time. The calculations
include all respondents in the sample; N 5 1,911 for waves 1, 2, and 4, and N 5
1,600 for wave 3.
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annualized change in hourly wages between years t1 4 and t as the de-
pendent variable and hours in t2 2 as an explanatory variable:
½lnðEt14=ht14Þ2 lnðEt=htÞ=45 f ðht22Þ:
This allows me to include data for the years after 1994 when NLSY79
becomes biennial.
Table 2
Hours Quantile Transition Probabilities
Wave 2 Quantile
Wave 1 Quantile
1
ð46–90 HoursÞ
2
ð41–48 HoursÞ
3
ð15–40 HoursÞ Total
1 ð46–90 hoursÞ 367 122 69 558
65.77% 21.86% 12.37%
2 ð41–45 hoursÞ 102 172 80 354
28.81% 48.59% 22.60%
3 ð3–40 hoursÞ 153 220 626 999
15.32% 22.02% 62.66%
Total 623 514 774 1,911
32.55% 26.90% 40.55%
Wave 3 Quantile
1
ð51–90 HoursÞ
2
ð41–50 HoursÞ
3
ð5–40 HoursÞ Total
1 ð46–90 hoursÞ 177 209 83 469
37.74% 44.56% 17.70%
2 ð41–45 hoursÞ 51 181 70 302
16.89% 59.93% 23.18%
3 ð3–40 hoursÞ 69 337 423 829
8.32% 40.65% 51.03%
Total 297 727 576 1,600
18.56% 45.44% 36.00%
Wave 4 Quantile
1
ð51–90 HoursÞ
2
ð46–50 HoursÞ
3
ð15–45 HoursÞ Total
1 ð46–90 hoursÞ 229 179 150 558
41.04% 32.08% 26.88%
2 ð41–45 hoursÞ 73 110 171 354
20.62% 31.07% 48.31%
3 ð3–40 hoursÞ 163 256 580 999
16.32% 25.63% 58.06%
Total 465 545 901 1,911
24.33% 28.52% 47.15%
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I use the 1979 cohort of the NLSY to complement my analysis and to
show that the results I derive are not unique to the universe of GMAT
registrants. In addition, NLSY79 is useful when I focus on self-employed
workers in Section IV.D because of the larger size of the study. Appendix
section B describes the construction of the NLSY79 sample using data up
until 2008. The sample consists of 35,103 observations for 4,445 male work-
ers; restricting this sample to college-educated workers leaves 6,575 obser-
vations for 915 males. Table 3 shows summary statistics for the restricted
and unrestricted samples. College-educated workers in the NLSY79 sam-
ple tend to be older and to have more experience, higher wages, and lower
wage growth compared to the GMAT Survey sample.
IV. Empirical Evidence of the Relationship between
Long Hours and Wage Growth
A. Semiparametric Model
It is useful to start by estimating a model that does not place any para-
metric restrictions on the relationship between hours and wage growth. In
particular, I follow theprocedure developed inRobinson ð1988Þ to estimate
a partial linear model of the form
ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t5 Zib1 f ðHoursi1Þ1 εi: ð1Þ
The variables that comprise the vector Zi include an experience profile,
education controls ðdummies forwhether the respondent completed a full-
time, part-time, or executive MBA program by the end of the survey pe-
riod, undergraduate major, and whether enrolled in school at the time of
the second interviewÞ, demographics ðgender, age, age squared, and raceÞ,
Table 3
NLSY79 Summary Statistics
Full Sample
ðN 5 35,103Þ
College Grads
ðN 5 6,575Þ
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Nonwhite .440 .264
Age 30.210 6.527 31.897 6.210
Married .507 .598
Number of children under 18 .814 1.117 .809 1.129
Actual experience 8.801 5.924 8.863 5.847
Mom has college degree .078 .230
Years of schooling 12.953 2.262 16.689 1.143
Hourly wage 11.629 7.529 17.199 10.867
Annualized log wage growth .026 .100 .042 .104
Hours 43.075 8.881 44.157 9.076
NOTE.—The summary statistics reflect all survey years in which a respondent enters the sample.
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and family characteristics ðmarital status, number of children under 18, and
an indicator for college-educated motherÞ. The denominator t of the de-
pendent variable represents the number of days between the second and
fourth interviews divided by 365. This accounts for the fact that the time
between interviews is not the same for all respondents. All 1,911 men and
women in the GMAT Registrant Survey sample are included in the esti-
mation.
The Z variables are likely to be correlated with hours, which biases the
results if the nonlinear function f is estimated using ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t2
Zib ðRobinson 1988Þ. I follow the suggested approach and start by finding
E½ðlnW4 2 lnW2Þ=tjHours1 and E½ZkjHours1 using a Nadaraya-Watson
Gaussian kernel estimator with optimal bandwidth. The unexplained parts
ðlnW4 2 lnW2Þ=t2 E½ðlnW4 2 lnW2Þ=tjHours1 and Z2 E½ZjHours1 are
then used to estimate b̂ by ordinary least squares, and the nonlinear por-
tion of equation ð1Þ is estimated also by Gaussian kernel regression using
the residuals ĥi 5 ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t2 Zib̂ as a dependent variable. Figure 3
shows the results for f̂ ðHours1Þ, including the 90% confidence bounds.
The graph suggests that the relationship between hours and the change
in log wages is nonlinear; there appears to be little or no correlation at low
levels of hours and a positive slope after about 50 hours. The confidence
bounds in panel A are fairly wide for large values of hours, but only 26 re-
spondents ð1.4% of the sampleÞ report working more than 65 hours per
week, so the right tail of the observed hours distribution is not going to
carry much weight in the parametric estimation. Panel B of figure 3 shows
the same graph, but I trim the observations for which the hours measure
is smaller than 35 or larger than 65. This interval includes 1,680 observa-
tions ð88% of the dataÞ and shows more clearly the nonlinearity in the
relationship. Based on the shape of f ðHoursÞ implied by figure 3, I model
the relationship between working hours and wage growth with a two-
piece linear spline; the change in regime point is estimated as a separate
parameter in the model. I discuss alternative empirical specifications in ap-
pendix section C.
B. Change in Regime Estimation with Unknown Breakpoint:
Nonlinear Least Squares
I estimate by nonlinear least squares the parameters of the two-piece
linear spline model
ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t5 g0 1 g1minðHoursi1; kÞ
1 g2maxðHoursi1 2 k; 0Þ1 Zib1 εi:
ð2Þ
I use k to denote the point at which the change of slope occurs, and the
vector Zi includes the controls listed in Section IV.A. The regression
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model imposes continuity, but there is no evidence of a jump at k when
this constraint is relaxed ðappendix, sec. C.1Þ. The reported errors are clus-
tered by the occupation reported at the second interview.
The first column of table 4 shows results for the pooled sample of men
and women because this yields higher precision of the estimates and al-
lows me to estimate the unexplained gender difference in wage growth
rates. The gender gap in wage growth is 1.24 log points after including all
controls. In the next two columns I split the sample by gender. Table 4
implies that up to about 47 hours per week, hours worked are not corre-
lated with wage growth; the parameter g1 is not statistically different from
zero in the second and third columns. It is equal to 20.0004 and is signif-
icant at the 10% level for the pooled sample. At the time of the first in-
terview, 16% of workers in the sample are employed and attending school
at the same time. This is likely to decrease labor supply in period 1 but in-
creases future wages, assuming a positive effect of schooling on earnings.
The negative relationship between hours and wage growth at lower levels
of hours can then be due to school enrollment. The coefficient g2 is posi-
tive and significant for the full sample and for the subsample of men and
positive but smaller and noisy for women. It is possible that ĝ2 is lower for
women because of gender differences in the propensity to select into com-
petitive occupations ðNiederle andVesterlund 2007Þ. The results imply that
when hours exceed 47, 5 extra hours per week ðabout one standard de-
viation conditional on hours exceeding 47Þ are associated with 1% in-
crease in annual wage growth. A test of the restriction that g1 equals g2
FIG. 3.—Semiparametric results for the relationship between hours and wage
growth. A, Semiparametric regression results. B, Semiparametric regression results
for hours between 35 and 65. Results for the partially linear model in equation ð1Þ.
Z includes gender, an experience profile, age, race, marital status, number of chil-
dren, mother’s education, college major, MBA degree, and whether in school. The
hours variable refers to first-period reported hours to avoid measurement error
bias. The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals. N 5 1,911. Gaussian
kernel; bandwidth 5 2.54. The graph in panel B is a close-up of panel A such that
35 ≤ Hours ≤ 65 ðN 5 1,680Þ.
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rejects the null hypothesis with a p-value lower than 0.0001, which im-
plies that the relationship is indeed nonlinear.17
I find that on average a part-time graduate business degree has no effect
on wage growth, while a full-time degree increases wage growth by 2%
17 I address the issue of division bias in more detail in Gicheva ð2010Þ, where I
show the results when the model in eq. ð2Þ is estimated with period 2 hours as
an explanatory variable. The coefficient g1 is much lower: it is equal to 20.0014
for the pooled sample and is highly significant. The point estimate of g2 is 0.0031
and also highly significant. The estimate for the cutoff point k is 45.1 for the whole
sample but is as low as 30.6 for the subsample of women. It is possible that current
period hours affect wage growth more than hours in t2 1, which generates part of
the difference, but this does not explain why g1 is much smaller. There is strong
reason to believe that measurement error is important. I also use wage data from
the third installment of the GMAT Registrant Survey to estimate the model in
ð2Þ when the dependent variable is ðlnW3 2 lnW2Þ=t, where t stands for time be-
tween the second and third interviews. The results are noisier but the point esti-
mates are similar to the ones from table 3. The estimate for the cutoff k is about
5 hours lower in these specifications. The estimate of the parameter g2 is of similar
magnitude ð0.0022Þ and is significant at the 5% level for the pooled sample; the
estimate of g1 is negative but not statistically distinguishable from zero. The full set
of results is available upon request.
Table 4
Nonlinear Least Squares Estimation Results, GMAT Survey
All
ð1Þ
Men
ð2Þ
Women
ð3Þ
Constant ðg0Þ .2987** .3498** .2713**
ð.0645Þ ð.0835Þ ð.0915Þ
minðHours; kÞ ðg1Þ 2.0004* 2.0004 2.0004
ð.0002Þ ð.0004Þ ð.0003Þ
maxðHours2 k; 0Þ ðg2Þ .0019** .0021** .0013
ð.0004Þ ð.0005Þ ð.0011Þ
k 47.6906** 47.3646** 47.2595**
ð1.9960Þ ð2.1890Þ ð5.7019Þ
Female 2.0124**
ð.0026Þ
MBA ðFTÞ .0204** .0137** .0283**
ð.0061Þ ð.0059Þ ð.0094Þ
MBA ðPTÞ .0008 2.0007 .0018
ð.0035Þ ð.0055Þ ð.0041Þ
MBA ðExecutiveÞ .0098 .0064 .0149
ð.0075Þ ð.0125Þ ð.0098Þ
R2 .1610 .1673 .1598
N 1,911 1,103 808
NOTE.—Estimation results for the model in eq. ð2Þ. The dependent variable is ðlnW4 2 lnW2Þ=t. All
specifications include an experience profile and controls for age, race, marital status, number of children,
mother’s education, college major, and whether in school. The hours variable refers to first-period
reported hours to avoid measurement error bias. The errors are clustered at the second interview occu-
pation level.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
Hours and Outcomes in High-End Labor 801
This content downloaded from 152.13.249.96 on Thu, 3 Oct 2013 14:05:53 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
per year. The estimated effect of an executive MBA is positive in all three
specifications, but only 89 people in the sample completed a degree of this
type, so the estimated coefficients are imprecise. The effect of a full-time
MBA degree is much stronger for women than it is for men. Obtaining the
degree increases female wage growth on average by 2.8% per year, while
the effect on men’s wages is less than half of this number.
In table 5, I reprint the results for the pooled sample and show three
other specifications that include different subsets of the control variables.
All models include a gender indicator and actual experience and experi-
ence squared. The model in the second column also controls for MBA
degree, college major, and school enrollment status. I add the age and race
variables to the model in the third column. The estimated cutoff k changes
little between specifications: it is between 46.91 and 47.69. The slope to
the left of the breakpoint is also stable but has the highest absolute value
when the education controls are excluded. This supports the conjecture that
the estimated coefficient on hours worked is slightly negative at low levels
Table 5
Does Excluding Some Controls Affect the Estimates?
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Constant ðg0Þ .1164** .1059** .3052** .2987**
ð.01195Þ ð.0096Þ ð.0649Þ ð.0645Þ
minðHours; kÞ ðg1Þ 2.0005* 2.0003 2.0004* 2.0004*
ð.0003Þ ð.0002Þ ð.0002Þ ð.0002Þ
maxðHours2 k; 0Þ ðg2Þ .0021** .0020** .0019** .0019**
ð.0005Þ ð.0005Þ ð.0004Þ ð.0004Þ
k 46.9076** 47.4908** 47.5330** 47.6906**
ð1.6837Þ ð1.9439Þ ð2.0031Þ ð1.9960Þ
Female 2.0107** 2.0128** 2.0128** 2.0124**
ð.0028Þ ð.0028Þ ð.0026Þ ð.0026Þ
MBA ðFTÞ .0215** .0207** .0204**
ð.0059Þ ð.0060Þ ð.0061Þ
MBA ðPTÞ .0016 .0009 .0008
ð.0035Þ ð.0035Þ ð.0035Þ
MBA ðExecÞ .0114 .0101 .0098
ð.0073Þ ð.0075Þ ð.0075Þ
Education No Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No No Yes Yes
Family No No No Yes
R2 .1191 .1479 .1589 .1610
NOTE.—Estimation results for the model in eq. ð2Þ. The dependent variable is ðlnW4 2 lnW2Þ=t. All
specifications include an experience profile. Education controls: whether in school at the time of second
interview, college major. Demographics: age, age squared, race dummies. Family controls: marital status,
number of children, mother’s education. The hours variable refers to first-period reported hours to avoid
measurement error bias. The errors are clustered at the second interview occupation level. N 5 1,911.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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of labor supply because lower hours are likely to be observed during pe-
riods of school enrollment. The coefficient on hours worked when hours
are higher than 47 increases to 0.0021 in the specification with the fewest
control variables, most likely because hours are picking up the effect of var-
iables such as age or marital status that are correlated with labor supply
preferences. Overall, the results in table 5 suggest that the relationship be-
tween hours and wage growth is robust to changes in the right-hand side
of the estimated equation.
The nonlinear least squares estimation method from this section has
three potential problems that appendix section C.1 addresses. First, the
model in equation ð2Þ may be misspecified if there is a discrete jump at
the breakpoint. Second, different variance of the error term before and
after the breakpoint could bias the results in table 4. Last, the optimiza-
tion process could be finding a local optimum at 47 hours. In appendix
section C.1, I adjust the objective function and estimate the two-part
linear spline model by maximum likelihood in order to confirm that none
of these concerns are viable.
Alternatively, the relationship between hours and the change in log
wages can be estimated using a higher degree polynomial. The estimated
coefficients on hours and hours squared in a quadratic model suggest a re-
lationship similar to the one implied by the two-piece linear spline param-
eters, as illustrated in appendix section C.2. Third and higher order terms
are not statistically significant. Appendix section C.2 also illustrates the
results when the coefficient of the second-period wage is not restricted to
equal one. The estimated relationship between hours and wage growth re-
mains robust.
C. Robustness of the Results
This section presents several other robustness checks as evidence that
the empirical results from Section IV.B are not driven by sample selection
issues or a peculiarity of the GMAT Survey data.
While job mobility has been ignored in the analysis up to now, job
transitions can be positively correlated with wage growth if they are as-
sociated with improvements in the worker-employer match ðJovanovic
1979Þ. If, in addition, job movers tend to have different hours than stayers,
the estimation results will be biased. Estimating equation ð2Þ separately
for job movers and stayers can also provide evidence for or against mod-
els of careers within firms, such as tournament theory. I address these is-
sues in the first two columns of table 6, where I show separately results for
the restricted sample of 485 workers who did not change employers be-
tween the second and fourth interviews and for the remaining 1,426 re-
spondents who reported a different employer at their last interview. The
estimates for g2 and k are highly significant and almost identical in the two
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samples: g2 is 0.0020 in column 1 and 0.0019 in column 2, while the corre-
sponding cutoffs are estimated at 47.9 and 47.8 hours. The coefficient g1
is more negative and is significant at the 10% level in column 2, which
may be due to workers who are enrolled in school in period 2 switching
to a higher paid full-time job upon graduation. This is also supported by
the positive and significant coefficient on full-time MBA in column 2;
the same coefficient is close to zero for workers who did not change em-
ployers. The estimate for g0 is higher for job movers ð0.3132 compared to
0.1838Þ, which may be indicative of improved job matches, consistent with
Jovanovic ð1979Þ.
To examinewhether school enrollment plays a role, I estimate themodel
excluding respondents who are attending school at the time of any of the
four interviews. I show the results in the third column of table 5. This re-
striction reduces the sample size to 716. The estimated coefficient on g1 is
much closer to zero: 20.00002 with a standard error of 0.0005. The value
of ĝ2 is 0.0020. The estimated value for k is slightly over 50 hours, and the
unexplained gender differential increases in absolute value to 20.0155. The
last two columns of table 6 show results when the sample is split into MBA
Table 6
Some Robustness Checks
Stayers
ð1Þ
Movers
ð2Þ
Not in School
ð3Þ
MBA
ð4Þ
No MBA
ð5Þ
Constant ðg0Þ .1838** .3132** .4221** .3746** .2078**
ð.0587Þ ð.0879Þ ð.0850Þ ð.0919Þ ð.0888Þ
minðHours; kÞ ðg1Þ 2.0002 2.0004* 2.00002 2.0008* 2.0001
ð.0004Þ ð.0002Þ ð.0005Þ ð.0004Þ ð.0003Þ
maxðHours2 k; 0Þ
ðg2Þ .0020** .0019** .0020** .0022** .0017*
ð.0008Þ ð.0006Þ ð.0010Þ ð.0005Þ ð.0009Þ
k 47.9120** 47.8081** 50.2707** 47.6695** 46.6340**
ð3.0975Þ ð2.2111Þ ð4.7024Þ ð1.8799Þ ð4.3926Þ
Female 2.0109* 2.0124** 2.0155** 2.0101** 2.0176**
ð.0056Þ ð.0029Þ ð.0054Þ ð.0034Þ ð.0059Þ
MBA ðFTÞ .0004 .0206**
ð.0077Þ ð.0058Þ
MBA ðPTÞ .0028 .0005 .0068
ð.0048Þ ð.0055Þ ð.0065Þ
MBA ðExecÞ .0000 .0129 .0400**
ð.0127Þ ð.0081Þ ð.0164Þ
R2 .1521 .1640 .1641 .1686 .1406
N 485 1,426 716 1,181 730
NOTE.—All specifications include an experience profile and controls for age, race, marital status, num-
ber of children, mother’s education, college major, and whether in school ðexcept for col. 3Þ. The hours
variable refers to first-period reported hours. The errors are clustered at the second interview occupation
level. The dependent variable is ðlnW4 2 lnW2Þ=t.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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completers and workers who did not have an MBA degree at t5 4.18 The
estimate for g2 for workers with a graduate business degree is 0.0022 and
highly significant; it equals 0.0017 and is significant at the 10% level for
respondents without an MBA. The breakpoint k is slightly different for the
two groups ð47.67 vs. 46.63Þ. The unexplained gender difference in wage
growth is almost 50% smaller for MBA graduates.
I next replicate the nonlinear least squares results for equation ð2Þ using
the full NLSY79 sample of males ðfirst column of table 7Þ19 and the sub-
sample of NLSY79 college graduates ðsecond column of table 7Þ. The mag-
nitude of the coefficient g2 for college graduates in NLSY79 is somewhat
lower than the GMAT Registrant Survey value ð0.0014Þ. It is even lower
but still significant if I include workers with fewer than 16 years of school-
ing ð0.0007Þ. The estimate for g1 is negative and significant in both speci-
fications. The point estimate for k is 46.5 for the full sample and 48.9 for
the subsample of college graduates. NLSY79 provides strong evidence that
the relationship between hours and wage growth found in the GMAT
Registrant Survey is not spurious. This relationship appears to be much
stronger for highly educated workers. This supports a theoretical model
representative of the high-end labor market. In the theory in Section II,
promotions to managerial positions that are highly sensitive to individual
productivity play a major role in the wage determination process.
D. Learning by Doing
The idea that future wages increase with current period hours is inherent
in learning-by-doing models. This well-known class of models, as devel-
oped by Arrow ð1962Þ and Rosen ð1972Þ, suggests that time spent at work
leads directly to human capital accumulation, so there is a positive rela-
tionship between the length of the workweek and productivity growth.
Human capital production technology in these models is usually charac-
terized by decreasing returns to scale with respect to the inputs, time in
particular ðe.g., Rosen 1972Þ. For a pure learning-by-doing model to yield
the prediction that the relationship between hours and wage growth is more
pronounced at high levels of hours, it is necessary to assume a human capi-
tal production function that is convex in hours worked. Such a production
function cannot be ruled out, especially in some highly paid professional
occupations in which there exist big nondivisible tasks. However, both the
18 Workers who complete a graduate management degree work on average 1
extra hour per week in the first period: 42.7 compared to 41.7 hours; this difference
is statistically significant at the 5% level.
19 The corresponding results for women are shown in Gicheva ð2010Þ, but they
should be interpreted with caution because females in NLSY79 tend to experience
more career interruptions than females in the GMAT Registrant Survey. None-
theless, the estimated coefficients do not differ much from the estimates for the
sample of men.
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GMAT Survey and the NLSY79 data show a convex relationship between
hours and wage growth for college-educated males, which would require
that a large fraction of all jobs that require a college degree is character-
ized by increasing returns to hours. Adding the job ladder component to
the model makes it more plausible and consistent with the literature.
Lazear and Moore ð1984Þ point out that learning-by-doing and on-the-
job training models should apply equally well to self-employed workers,
while job-ladder models are not relevant to this group. Their approach
would be valid in the setting discussed here if the job level structure de-
scribed earlier in the paper is not available to those who are self-employed;
that is, if self-employed work does not consist of activities with different
returns to skill that agents can switch between freely.
I estimate a two-part linear spline specification in which the breakpoint
is fixed at 46 hours and compare the estimates for workers in NLSY79 who
are self-employed at time t and for the main sample. The estimated coef-
ficient on hours is very different for self-employed and not self-employed
workers. The results for the latter sample are similar to the numbers in
column 1 of table 7. The results for the self-employed sample fit a learning-
by-doing model with a human capital production function that is concave
in hours worked. The coefficient on hours equals 0.0015 and is significant
at the 5% level when hours are less than 46, and is zero to the right of the
breakpoint. This finding serves as some evidence against a simple learning-
by-doing model as the single explanation of the observed nonlinear rela-
tionship.
Learning by doing is nonetheless an essential component of the model
in Section II, and presumably the rate of human capital accumulation de-
Table 7
Nonlinear Least Squares, NLSY79
Full Sample
ð1Þ
College Grads
ð2Þ
Constant ðg0Þ .0965** .0650**
ð.0123Þ ð.0328Þ
minðHours; kÞ ðg1Þ 2.0007** 2.0006**
ð.0001Þ ð.0003Þ
maxðHours2 k; 0Þ ðg2Þ .0007** .0014**
ð.0002Þ ð.0004Þ
k 46.4915** 48.8906**
ð1.5189Þ ð2.2653Þ
R2 .0509 .0703
NOTE.—Estimation results for the model in eq. ð2Þ. All specifications in-
clude number of years of completed schooling, year dummies, an experience
profile, and controls for race, number of children, and marital status. The
errors are clustered at the individual level. The hours variable refers to hours
reported in t2 2 to avoid measurement error bias. The dependent variable is
ðlnWt14 2 lnWtÞ=4. N 5 35,103 in col. 1 and 6,575 in col. 2.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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creases for older workers. When the NLSY79 sample is split into workers
with fewer than 10 years of experience and observations for which expe-
rience is 10 years or more and the value of the cutoff k is set at 46 hours,
the estimates suggest that the slope to the right of the break is decreasing
in experience, more so for workers with 16 or more years of schooling.
The coefficient for the college-educated sample changes from 0.0015 to
0.0006 and loses significance when comparing the low and high experi-
ence groups. The change for the full sample is from 0.0006 to 0.0005. The
coefficient on hours when hours are lower than 46 remains negative in all
specifications.20 Overall, NLSY79 data suggest that there is a relationship
between learning on the job and career wage growth, but a richer model
is necessary to explain some features of the data.21
V. Empirical Evidence on Promotions
Studies of career advancement ðBaker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994a,
1994b; Gibbons andWaldman 1999Þ predict a serial correlation of promo-
tions over time.22 The theory in Section II, if extended to more than two
time periods, would also imply that workers with high learning ability
ðor lower disutility of hoursÞ receive promotions faster anywhere along
the job ladder. The design of the GMAT Registrant Survey is very dif-
ferent from the detailed employment records of a single medium-sized
US firm in Baker et al. ð1994a, 1994bÞ, but I am able to carry out some re-
lated empirical tests. The coefficient of correlation between the number of
promotions reported at t5 1 and promotions between t5 1 and t5 4 is
0.2698.23 When the sample is limited to workers who put in 48 hours or
more in the first period, this coefficient increases to 0.3704. The correlation
goes up even more ð0.4721Þ when hours are restricted to be greater than or
20 See Gicheva ð2010Þ for the full set of results discussed in this section.
21 For example, the model in Sec. II can be extended to more than two periods.
Workers with lower values of the speed of learning uwould be promoted at higher
levels of experience, and for them the impact of an extra hour on late-career ability
would be lower.
22 Several recent studies add to Baker et al.’s ð1994aÞ empirical evidence in sup-
port of the Gibbons and Waldman ð1999Þmodel and extend it to different OECD
countries. Lluis ð2005Þ uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which
provides information on job ranks, and finds increasing returns to skill in upper
levels of the job ladder. The conclusion of her study is that assignment into ranks is
nonrandomwith respect to ability. The investigation in da Silva and van der Klaauw
ð2011Þ is based on a large Portuguese matched employer-employee data set. They
show a serial correlation in movements from one hierarchical level to the next, even
after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Kauhanen andNapari
ð2012Þ use a long matched panel survey of multiple firms and workers to find sim-
ilar patterns in the Finnish labor market. In particular, the data again point to a se-
rial correlation in promotions, including in the presence of across-firm mobility.
23 Number of promotions data are only available for 507 of the 1,911 respon-
dents in the sample.
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equal to 55. While these data are likely measured with error and the num-
ber of promotions depends largely on the specific hierarchy within each
firm, these trends are unlikely to be purely an artifact of measurement er-
ror. Workers who report 48 hours or more in wave 1 are more likely to be
promoted between waves 1 and 2: 52.36% compared to 40.95% of lower-
hour workers. The null hypothesis of no difference can be rejected at a
very low significance level. This evidence is consistent with the idea of fast-
track jobs.
A testable implication of the theory in Section II is that the probability
of receiving a promotion is nondecreasing in hours and inherent ability.
The GMAT Registrant Survey asks respondents whether they have man-
agerial responsibilities in their job. I use this information to construct a
promotion variable that is more uniform across different employers. I use
a subsample of 940 workers who report not having managerial responsi-
bilities at the time of their initial interview and set the promotion mea-
sure to equal 1 for those who had managerial duties at t5 4 and 0 oth-
erwise. I estimate a partial linear regression model similar to the one in
Section IV.A but with the promotion variable on the left-hand side and
controls for demographics and schooling on the right-hand side. Figure 4
shows that the relationship between hours worked and the probability of
being promoted has the shape predicted by the model: flat for very low
and very high values of hours and upward sloping in the middle of the
FIG. 4.—Hours and the probability of promotion. Results for a partially linear
model: Promotioni 5 Zib1 f ðHoursi1Þ1 εi. See Section V for the definition of the
dependent variable; Z includes gender, an experience profile, age, race, and MBA
degree. The hours variable refers to first-period reported hours. The dashed lines
represent 90% confidence intervals. The sample is limited to observations for which
first-period hours are between 35 and 65. N 5 914. Epanechnikov kernel; band-
width 5 3.
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distribution. In the nonlinear estimation I include only workers whose
hours are between 35 and 65 to limit the influence of outliers. Thus, I use
914 of the 940 observations available. The 90% confidence bounds in the
figure are fairly wide because of the small sample size. I next parameter-
ize the relationship between hours and promotions and estimate a probit
regression model using all 940 observations.
Table 8 shows marginal effects from the probit regressions. Working 5
extra hours per week is associated with a more than 2.5% increase in the
probability of receiving a promotion for the average worker in the sam-
ple; the estimate is significant at the 5% level even though the sample is
small. In the first column I do not include any ability controls, and the
estimated relationship is the strongest. The rest of the specifications in-
clude two measures of the inherent ability parameter u. The first measure
is whether the respondent attended one of the top 10% most competi-
tive colleges according to Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges ð1994Þ.
This variable is observed by firms, so it is possible for employers to use this
information when making promotion decisions. The second measure of
inherent ability in table 8 is unobserved by employers: an indicator for
college-educated mother. Both variables have a positive correlation with
the probability of advancing to a managerial position; the coefficients are
Table 8
The Role of Long Hours and Inherent Ability in Promotions
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Hours ðwave 1Þ .0068** .0058** .0057** .0051**
ð.0025Þ ð.0026Þ ð.0026Þ ð.0026Þ
Female 2.0373 2.0336 2.0265 2.0277
ð.0340Þ ð.0342Þ ð.0344Þ ð.0345Þ
Attended competitive college .0873* .0813* .0814*
ð.0446Þ ð.0455Þ ð.0456Þ
Mom has college degree .0772** .0828** .0861**
ð.0367Þ ð.0371Þ ð.0372Þ
MBA ðFTÞ .1208** .1210**
ð.0562Þ ð.0562Þ
MBA ðPTÞ .1148** .1161**
ð.0367Þ ð.0368Þ
MBA ðExecÞ .2242** .2158**
ð.0697Þ ð.0708Þ
Experience ðwave 1Þ .0324*
ð.0185Þ
Experience squared 2.0009
ð.0009Þ
NOTE.—GMAT Registrant Survey sample, limited to workers who do not hold a managerial position at
the beginning of the survey. The dependent variable is whether advanced to managerial position. The re-
ported coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions. All specifications include controls for race,
age, and age squared. N 5 940.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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statistically significant. The estimated marginal effect of the college quality
variable is over 0.08.24 The marginal effect of the variable measuring moth-
er’s education is similar in magnitude. The results suggest that both hours
and ability have a positive correlation with the probability of moving up
to a managerial position.
VI. Discussion
A. Alternative Theoretical Approaches
The notion that working hours are tied to career outcomes is most com-
mon to “rat race” models, in which the disutility of hours is generally only
known to the worker and strongly correlated with a component of pro-
ductivity unobserved by employers. In these models employers base pro-
motion decisions on revealed preferences. This concept is developed in
Rebitzer and Taylor ð1995Þ. In their efficiency wage model, hours are di-
rectly related to productivity through workers’ propensity for shirking, but
work incentives are created through dismissal threats instead of promotion
opportunities. Firms can also use maternity leave take-up as a screening
device ðLeslie, Manchester, and Park 2008Þ. Landers et al. ð1996Þ consider
a setting in which firms establish long-hour norms that should discour-
age workers with preferences for short hours from hiding their true type.
Their study also links long hours to promotions, but its scope is limited to
the specific hierarchy within law firm partnerships. A “rat race” version of
my model can predict the nonlinear relationship between hours and wage
growth under a separating equilibrium in which employers set high-hour
norms for promotion. In the theory I present in Section II, I obtain the de-
sired result without the need to introduce incomplete information, which
is why it is the preferred model. The main difference between the complete
and incomplete information models is that the latter implies that some
workers may put in inefficiently long hours, while others may be ineffi-
ciently left without a promotion.25
24 Seventeen percent of the sample used in the estimation graduated from a com-
petitive college.
25 It is hard to design a convincing test that could differentiate between the rat
race and efficient sorting theories. Some suggestive evidence that most workers in
the United States do not work inefficiently long hours can be found. The GMAT
Registrant Survey and NLSY79 do not ask respondents about their desired num-
ber of hours, but in the PSID sample that Altonji and Paxson ð1988Þ use for their
study, only about 5.5% of respondents report being constrained in their choice of
hours and working more hours than they would like ðalthough the authors point
out that the phrasing of the question may lead to an underestimateÞ. Similarly, the
International Social Survey statistics that Bell and Freeman ð2001Þ report show
that in 1997, 10.3% of sampled US workers preferred shorter workweeks, while
57.7% were content with their current hours. In contrast, in Landers et al.’s law
firm survey, 65.4% of associates report that they would take a reduction in hours if
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Along the lines of rat race models, one can similarly consider a career
concerns model in which output is linear in ability in each job level and
workers are assigned to levels based on expected ability ðHolmstrom 1999Þ.
Such assignment can create a convexity in the observed returns.26 The main
difference from the separating equilibrium in Landers et al. ð1996Þ is that
in Holmstrom’s ð1999Þ theory workers determine the number of hours
supplied to the labor market, and true ability is unobserved by all market
participants but revealed over time. Holmstrom shows that labor supply
can deviate up or down from the optimal level, so although hours may not
be efficient, the outcome is not necessarily overwork. Career concerns the-
ory is characterized by decreasing incentives over time because there is less
learning by employers and less time to realize potential gains from higher
perceived productivity. This feature of the model is not fully consistent
with the observation that hours for young workers in the high-end labor
market tend to be fairly constant or increase slightly over time.27
A tournament model ðLazear and Rosen 1981Þ can also predict a con-
vex relationship between hours and wage growth when hours are closely
linked to output, so that workers who choose to put in longer hours are
more likely to win the tournament and receive a promotion. A feature of
tournament theory is that it characterizes careers within firms. I show in
Section IV that the relationship I find is very similar for job stayers and
movers, which a tournament model alone cannot account for.
The asymmetric learning theory introduced in Waldman ð1984Þ is an
alternative to the tournament model that can be better reconciled with
workers earning similar wages upon promotion regardless of whether they
stay with their current firm. In this model, only current employers observe
workers’ ability, but other firms use promotions ðor the lack of a promo-
tionÞ as a signal. Unlike the tournament theory in Lazear and Rosen ð1981Þ,
wages in each job level are determined by the competitive labor market;
within a level, wages do not vary with ability. One way to incorporate
hours into the asymmetric learning model is suggested by the extension
in Zabojnik and Bernhardt ð2001Þ. In their model, ex ante identical work-
26 Holmstrom bases this observation on the discussion in Rosen ð1982Þ.
27 See, e.g., fig. 2. In the college-educated NLSY79 sample, mean weekly hours
conditional on working at least 15 hours are 41.2 in 1984, 44.9 in 1994, and 45.3 in
2004.
given the choice. A question that cannot be answered with the available data is
which group is more similar to the population that I study. A 2006 question in
NLSY79 asks about the amount of time that respondents devote to volunteer ac-
tivities. College-educated men in the sample who work 46 hours per week volun-
teer at least as much as college graduates who work fewer hours ðthis is consistent
with Freeman ½1997Þ. If devoting little or no time to volunteer work is some in-
dication of labor market work beyond the most preferred level, then this should
also favor the idea that observed hours tend to be efficient.
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ers face different human capital investment incentives depending on their
firm’s technology. More productive firms hire a greater number of lower-
level employees per managerial position, so promotions in these firms are
less likely but are associated with higher wage premiums. Workers in these
larger firms have a stronger incentive to invest in human capital accumula-
tion, for instance, through longer hours and more learning by doing. This
can result in a convex relationship between hours and wage growth. How-
ever, table 8 shows that longer hours are also associated with higher pro-
motion probabilities, which can only be reconciled with the Zabojnik sand
Bernhardt ð2001Þ model if additional worker heterogeneity is introduced.
The first, third, and fourth waves of the GMAT Registrant Survey offer
some information about the size of the firms that respondents work at;
this information is missing for part of the sample. Including controls for
firm size, when available, does not change the estimated relationship be-
tween hours and wage growth ðthese results are available from the author
on requestÞ, which does not follow the theory in Zabojnik and Bernhardt
ð2001Þ.
B. Implication of the Results for the Gender Wage Gap
In this section, I present an example that is contingent on the assump-
tion that male and female workers have similar distributions of the speed
of learning u, but the distribution of the disutility of hours b is shifted to
the right for women. The model in Section II suggests that this exogenous
difference in labor supply preferences leads to an expanding gender wage
gap.28 A contribution of my study is that I use hours at a given point in
time to predict the divergence in the wages of men and women over time,
while previous studies have been controlling for observed hours in each
period.
I find that when controlling for hours worked, women’s wages grow
1.24% slower than the wages of men ðsee table 4Þ. Wave 1 hours exceed
47 for 34% of men and 21% of women. For these long-hour workers, av-
erage hours are 53 for women and 54 for men. Then, if the average wage
growth for men who put in 47 or fewer hours is x ðand assuming that the
correlation between hours and wage growth is 0 when h < 48Þ,
28 The terms “preferences” and “disutility of hours” are used broadly here. The
exercise in this section is based only on the assumption that the distribution of b
is farther to the right for women than it is for men, regardless of the reasons for
this shift. Preferences, in the traditional sense of the term, may play a role if female
workers derive higher utility from leisure or are less willing to tolerate stressful,
long-hour jobs. It is often the case that females are the primary caregivers in house-
holds with children or elderly members, either because of comparative advantage
or due to gender differences in bargaining power within couples, which would also
restrict the hours women are willing and able to supply to the labor market.
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E½lnwmale1 2 lnwmale0 5 ð0:66Þx1 ð0:34Þðx1 ðE½hjh > 472 47Þð0:0019ÞÞ;
which means that E½lnwmale1 2 lnwmale0 5 x1 ð0:34Þð542 47Þð0:0019Þ. For
women, E½lnwfemale1 2 lnwfemale0 5 x2 0:01241 ð0:21Þð532 47Þð0:0019Þ.
What these calculations suggest is that there are three main reasons why
the wages of male workers tend to grow faster. First, there is the unex-
plained difference in wage growth, which equals 1.24% per year. Second,
fewer women put in more than 47 hours per week and, last, conditional
of working more than 47 hours, women average one fewer hour per week.
The gender difference in wage growth after accounting for demographics
and education is 0:01241 ð0:0019Þðð0:34Þð7Þ2 ð0:21Þð6ÞÞ5 0:015. Only
about 14% of the gap in wage growth is accounted for by differences in
hours. These calculations use the pooled sample coefficient for the rela-
tionship between hours and wage growth ð0.0019Þ. Columns 2 and 3 of ta-
ble 4 suggest that hours might account for a larger portion of the gender
wage gap because, if estimated separately, the coefficients equal 0.0021 for
men and 0.0013 for women ð0.0018 for women with no children at the
time of the second interviewÞ.
Bertrand et al. ð2010Þ find that for graduates of the University of Chi-
cago Booth School of Business, the gap in the wages of men and women
without career interruptions increases by 20 log points in the first 9 years
after graduation.29 They attribute about half of this gap to differences in
hours. This means that the growth of men’s wages is on average 2.2% faster
per year.30 Women in the GMAT Registrant Survey sample experience
slightly more career interruptions than men, but the way in which I select
respondents imposes that they held a job in waves 1, 2, and 4. On average,
women in the sample accumulate 3 fewer months of experience between
the first and last installments of the survey.
I expand the findings in Bertrand et al. ð2010Þ to include a wider seg-
ment of the labor force. Extremely long hours, higher earnings, and fast ca-
reer advancement are typical for the population of their study; the GMAT
Registrant Survey sample is representative of a somewhat less high-end por-
tion of the labor market. In the GMAT Registrant Survey sample, the gen-
der difference in hours when reported hours are greater than 47 is only about
1 hour, while in the Bertrand et al. ð2010Þ sample this difference starts at
1.8 right after graduation and grows to 6 hours in the ninth year after grad-
uation ðfor all employedwomen, including those with career interruptionsÞ.
Given a 6-hour difference in the labor supply of men and women working
29 Bertrand et al. ð2010Þ run a separate wage regression for each year after grad-
uation and find that the coefficient on the female indicator increases with the
number of years after completing an MBA degree.
30 The mean annual increase in the gender wage gap varies between 1.6 and 4.3
log points if estimates for the difference in wages 2 to 8 years postgraduation are
used instead.
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more than 47 hours, my results would predict a gender gap in annual wage
growth for high-labor supply workers equal to 0:01241 ð0:0019Þð6Þ, or 2.4
log points. In this case the difference in hours worked accounts for 48%
of the gap. These numbers are very close to what Bertrand et al. ð2010Þ find.
The implications of the long-term consequences of gender differences
in labor supply are dependent on the way in which one chooses to model
the high-end labor market. In the rat race setup, in which there are inef-
ficiencies associated with long hours ðAkerlof 1976; Landers et al. 1996Þ,
appropriate policy interventions that favor employees who choose shorter
hours due to child care or elderly care responsibilities may be Pareto im-
proving. Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor ð1997Þ discuss the potential benefits
and downsides of several such policies. Interventions of this sort could
also be beneficial if, as discussed in note 28, the labor market is character-
ized by efficient sorting, but revealed labor supply preferences are based
on inefficient division of household responsibilities. If, on the other hand,
sorting in the high-end market is fully efficient, which is the most direct
interpretation of the model in Section II, then policy interventions aimed
to equalize gender differences in the labor market are not necessary.
C. Quantifying the Return to an Additional Hour
Working an extra hour per week in the present period ðt5 0Þ has a two-
fold effect on lifetime earnings. First, there is a direct effect on current pe-
riod earnings holding the wage rate constant.31 Second, there is a marginal
return to labor supply from the increase in wage growth between years 0
and 1. The relationship between hours and wage growth that I estimate in
Section IV is an annualized average using wage growth over a 5–6-year
period. For this example I assume that the estimated coefficient represents
the relationship between hours and a 1-year increase in wages.
Consider a male worker who normally puts in 48 hours per week but
for 1 year increases his workweek by 1 hour. For men who at the time of
their first interview work between 48 and 53 hours, median hourly earn-
ings equal $15.50 ðthe median is $15 with a mean of $15.80 for all 1,103
males in the sampleÞ. The average wage growth for males who put in 47
or 48 hours in period 1 is 5.4% per year, which is the number I use below
ðthe median annualized wage growth in the full sample of men is 5.6%
with a mean of 6.4%Þ. The present discounted value associated with the
0.19% increase in hourly wage growth between t5 0 and t5 1 is
PDV 5 o
T
t51
btð0:0019Þð48Þð$15:50Þð1:054Þðt21Þ:
31 In the GMATRegistrant Survey sample, wave 2 wages do not vary much with
hours in the middle portion of the wage distribution, so I assume that an increase
in hours worked does not have an immediate effect on hourly earnings.
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Assuming a discount factor b of 0.9 and T 5 20 years of experience ða fairly
low number given that I focus on workers whose average age is below 30Þ,
the shadow wage is $31.64 when the observed wage is $15.50. This means
that the marginal return from higher wage growth is as large as the ob-
served wage.
Alternatively, one can compare the predicted earnings of two employ-
ees with the same ability u but different labor supply preferences: one who
always works 48 hours and another one who consistently puts in 49 hours
per week. The first worker has a present discounted value of earnings given
by
PDV1 5 o
T
t50
btð1:054Þtð48Þð52Þð$15:50Þ;
which is equal to $465,478 when b5 0:9 and T 5 20. Assuming that the
relationship between hours and wage growth is present between years 0
and 10, the earnings stream with a 49-hour workweek is
PDV2 5 o
10
t50
btð1:0559Þtð49Þð52Þð$15:50Þ
1 o
T
t511
btð1:054Þðt210Þð1:0559Þ10ð49Þð52Þð$15:50Þ:
Then PDV2 5 $481;124 and the difference between the two numbers is
$15,646. If hours did not affect wage growth, the present discounted value
of the earnings of the second worker would equal PDV3 5 $475;176. Then
PDV3 2 PDV1 5 $9;697. This shows that 38% of the increase in the life-
time earnings of a worker who is willing to put in 1 extra hour per week is
due to faster wage growth.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a model that combines learning on the job and
promotions when workers differ in their preferences for leisure. I use this
theory to explain a previously undocumented trend that constitutes the fo-
cus of the empirical part of the study: wage growth is increasing in work-
ing hours when hours are high.
Using a four-wave panel survey of GMAT registrants and data from
the 1979 cohort of the NLSY, I find that for employees whose workweek
is 48 hours or longer, adding 5 extra hours per week is associated with a
1% increase in annual wage growth. The correlation is zero when weekly
hours are less than 48. The observed relationship between hours and wage
growth is similar in the two data sets when theNLSY79 sample is restricted
to college graduates, which implies that the applicability of the findings is
not limited to the population of GMAT registrants. The relationship is
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present but much weaker among workers with less than 16 years of school-
ing, which points to an underlying mechanism specific to the high-end
labor market. The results are robust to various functional form specifica-
tions and estimation procedures.
The data confirm several other testable implications of the model. The
probability of receiving a promotion is an increasing function of hours
worked and proxies for the speed of learning on the job. I estimate the
empirical model using a sample of self-employed workers from NLSY79
and find that for these workers the observed relationship between hours
worked and the change in hourly wages is consistent with a learning-by-
doing model with a concave human capital production function and no
promotion-related discrete wage jumps.
The estimated relationship between hours and wage growth is fairly
large in magnitude. It implies that the observed hourly wage is about half
of the shadow wage for workers who are young, where the unobserved
portion of the value of an additional hour is due to the increase in wage
growth.32 Under the assumption that women have inherently higher dis-
utility of hours, my findings can be used to account for somewhere be-
tween 14% and 48% of the gender difference in wage growth, depending
on the size of the labor supply gap. These numbers are important in that
they provide a better understanding of the labor market choices of young
highly educated workers and the career implications of these choices.
One limitation of the model and data analysis that should be addressed
in future work is that the added complexity of joint household labor sup-
ply decisions is ignored. In the GMAT Registrant Survey sample, 94% of
females and 86% of males have no children at the time of their first in-
terview, which is also when the measure of hours used in the empirical
analysis is collected. While household decisions may not be a driving force
in the GMAT Survey data, it is likely that among other groups of the pop-
ulation this may be a factor that exacerbates the gender differences in wage
growth.
Appendix
A. Probability of Receiving a Promotion Conditional on
Inherent Ability and First-Period Hours
The promotion cutoff for the disutility of labor parameter bðviÞ takes
the form bðviÞ5 Avi, where A is a function of the parameters in the model.
32 In his overview of some of the literature on the elasticity of labor supply,
Keane ð2011Þ also points out that the shadow value of an additional hour tends to
be considerably higher than the observedwage, especially for youngworkers, when
labor supply decisions are viewed in an intertemporal framework that allows for
learning by doing.
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Then PrðPromotionjviÞ5 Prðbi ≤ AviÞ, which equals FbðAviÞ, where Fb is
the density function that characterizes the distribution of the disutility pa-
rameter. The probability of promotion is increasing in vi but the exact
shape of the relationship depends on the distribution of b.
Suppose that for worker i observed hours equal h1i 5 h. Denote
gðhÞ5 d1 1 c1h1ð2A2 c1h1Þh
and
gðhÞ5 2Aðd1 1 c1h1Þ1 c2h1ðd2 1 c2h1Þð4A2 2 c22h21Þh
:
Then
PrðPromotionjhÞ5 12 FvðgðhÞÞ
FvðgðhÞÞ1 12 FvðgðhÞÞ ;
where Fv is the density of u.33 Both gðhÞ and gðhÞ are decreasing in h when
h is positive, so the probability of receiving a promotion is nondecreasing
in hours. For the slope to be zero hours have to be either very high or very
low. When observed hours hL are low so that FvðgðhLÞÞ5 1 and FvðgðhLÞÞ
≤ 1, the probability of receiving a promotion is zero. Even high values of u
can be insufficient to compensate for a very high disutility of hours. Alter-
natively, for a high value of hours,hH, such that FvðgðhHÞÞ ≥ 0 and FvðgðhHÞÞ
5 0, the probability of receiving a promotion is 1.
This suggests that PrðPromotionjh1Þ is increasing in first-period hours,
but the shape of the relationship depends on any assumptions about the
distributions of the parameters.
B. Construction of NLSY79 Sample
I drop the 1,280 respondents from the military sample of NLSY79
because they have different employment patterns and most are excluded
from the survey after 1984. Females are dropped from the sample. Years
in which a respondent was not interviewed are excluded, but if individ-
uals returned to the survey in subsequent interviews, they are included in
the sample for those years. I exclude respondents who reported being in
school in every interview year and observations for which an individual
was not employed at a government, private, or nonprofit job.
In all NLSY79 specifications hours and hourly wages apply to the main
ðCPSÞ job. Information on secondary jobs for multiple jobholders is not
included. NLSY79 reports hourly wages that are constructed by dividing
reported earnings by reported usual hours per week and the relevant time
33 See Gicheva ð2010Þ for more details.
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period, since respondents are given a choice of time unit to report earn-
ings. Wages are reported in 1991 dollars. Actual experience is computed
as the number of years after leaving school in which a respondent’s usual
hours per week exceeded 30 and weeks worked per year were at least 26
ðwhich corresponds to full-time workÞ. For the years after 1994, since the
survey becomes biennial, it is assumed that if a respondent worked full-
time in year t, he was also working full-time in t2 1. When available, I
use a series of variables on employment history for the period 1975–77 to
construct actual experience.
I only keep observations for which respondents are at least 19 years old
and have nonmissing hours and wages. I keep observations for which the
real wage is between $2 and $200 and usual weekly hours are at least 15.
I set hours equal to 90 if the reported value exceeds 90. Self-employed
workers and those with not enough information to construct the actual
experience measure are dropped.
C. Alternative Empirical Specifications
1. Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The approach in this section is based on the estimation technique pro-
posed by Quandt ð1958Þ; the method is appropriate when the indepen-
dent variable that determines the nonlinearity is discrete. LetN denote the
number of observations in the sample. If the data are sorted on hours, for
every k ∈ ½hmin; hmax there exists anm such that hi ≤ k when 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
hi > k for m < i ≤ N. Then for a given k, the log likelihood function takes
the form
logL5 2
N
2
log ð2pÞ2mlog j1 2 ðN 2mÞlogj2
2
1
2j21
o
m
i51
ðyi 2 Zib2 a1 2 b1Hoursi1Þ2 2 1
2j22
o
N
i5m11
ðyi 2 Zib2 a2 2 b2Hoursi1Þ2:
ðA1Þ
The parameters j1 and j2 denote the standard deviations of the errors
for observations respectively before and after the breakpoint k, and yi 5
ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t. I maximize the objective function in ðA1Þ over every
integer value of k excluding the ends of the observed hours distribution
where there are not enough observations to identify either a1 and b1 or a2
and b2. I choose the set of parameter estimates based on the k for which the
log likelihood function attains its highest level. Figure A1 shows the dis-
tribution of the maximized log likelihood values over the range of k for
the pooled sample of men and women. The function has several local max-
ima but attains its global maximum at 48 hours.
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Table A1 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in
ðA1Þ for different subsets of the controls in the vector Zi. The optimal
change in slope occurs at k5 48 in all specifications. The estimates for the
slope before and after the cutoff are very similar to the numbers reported
in table 4. The results in table A1 also imply that the data are heteroske-
dastic: the standard deviation of the error is smaller at lower levels of hours
ð0.0577 compared to 0.0708Þ, and the difference is statistically significant.
However, accounting for heteroskedasticity in the model specification does
not affect the slope coefficients, as suggested by the closeness of the non-
linear least squares and maximum likelihood estimates.
It is also evident from table A1 that there is no discontinuity at k. In the
specification with the full set of controls the point estimate for a1 is 0.2870
and the estimate for b1 is 20.0004, so the value of y approaches a1 1 kb1
5 0:2678 when hours approach 48 from the left. The point estimates for
a2 and b2 equal 0.1779 and 0.0019, respectively, so y approaches 0.1779 1
ð0.0019Þð48Þ 5 0.2691 when hours approach 48 from the right.
Quandt ð1958Þ also proposes a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis
that no switch occurred against the alternative that there is one change in
regime. He defines the likelihood ratio as l5 ½LðQÞ=½LðQÞ, where LðQÞ
is the unrestricted maximum of the likelihood function under the alterna-
tive hypothesis and LðQÞ is the restricted maximum under the null. The
likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of equal slopes with a p-value
below 0.001.
2. Polynomial in Hours and Wage Level Specifications
A convex relationship between hours and wage growth can also be mod-
eled with anmth degree polynomial function of the form
ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t5 a0 1 o
m
r51
arHours
r
i1 1 Zib1 ni: ðA2Þ
For regressions with m ≥ 2, the resulting coefficients are estimated with a
high level of noise, som5 2 yields the preferred specification. An even less
parametrically restrictive functional form would allow the coefficient on
lnWi2=t to be different from one. I estimate two variations of this model: a
nonlinear least squares one:
ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t5 g0 1 g1minðHoursi1; kÞ1 g2maxðHoursi1 2 k; 0Þ
1 g3lnWi2 1 Zib1 εi ðA3Þ
and a quadratic in hours:
ðlnWi4 2 lnWi2Þ=t5 a0 1 o
m
r51
arHours
r
i1 1 d lnWi2 1 Zib1 ni: ðA4Þ
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All results for the full GMAT Survey sample, along with the baseline spec-
ification in equation ð2Þ, are illustrated in figure A2, where I plot the pre-
dicted change in log wages as a function of hours: ŷ5 ĝ1min ðHoursi1; k̂Þ
1 ĝ2maxðHoursi1 2 k̂; 0Þ for the nonlinear least squares specifications and
ŷ5 â1Hoursi1 1 â2Hours
2
i1 for the polynomial specifications. Confidence
intervals are not shown, but all estimates with the exception of ĝ1 in ð2Þ and
ðA3Þ are significant at the 1% level. It is evident from figure A2 that the
slope of the estimated relationship between hours and the change in log
wages when hours exceed 47 is consistent across the different specifica-
tions.
FIG. A1.—Distribution of the log likelihood function values over the cutoff k.
Maximized values of the log likelihood function in equation ð3Þ over the observed
distribution of hours excluding the tails. The full GMATRegistrant Survey sample
is used in the estimation. N 5 1,911.
FIG. A2.—Predicted change in log wages from alternative specifications
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Table A1
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Hours < k:
Constant ða1Þ .1167** .1038** .2938** .2870**
ð.0131Þ ð.0138Þ ð.0738Þ ð.0745Þ
Hours ðb1Þ 2.0006 2.0004 2.0004 2.0004
ð.0003Þ ð.0003Þ ð.0003Þ ð.0003Þ
Hours ≥ k:
Constant ða2Þ 2.0030 2.0050 .1863** .1779**
ð.0358Þ ð.0372Þ ð.0821Þ ð.0831Þ
Hours ðb2Þ .0020** .0019** .0019** .0019**
ð.0006Þ ð.0006Þ ð.0006Þ ð.0006Þ
Female 2.0104** 2.0125** 2.0124** 2.0121**
ð.0047Þ ð.0045Þ ð.0044Þ ð.0045Þ
j1 .0597** .0582** .0578** .0577**
ð.0009Þ ð.0009Þ ð.0008Þ ð.0008Þ
j2 .0712** .0714** .0708** .0708**
ð.0031Þ ð.0029Þ ð.0029Þ ð.0029Þ
k 48 48 48 48
Education No Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No No Yes Yes
Family No No No Yes
NOTE.—Estimation results for the model in eq. ðA1Þ. The dependent variable is ðlnW4 2 lnW2Þ=t. All
specifications include an experience profile. Education controls: MBA dummies, whether in school at the
time of second interview, college major. Demographics: age, age squared, race dummies. Family controls:
marital status, number of children, mother’s education. The hours variable refers to first-period reported
hours to avoid measurement error bias. N 5 1,911.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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